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A Novel Transparent and Auditable
Fog-Assisted Cloud Storage with Compensation Mechanism
Donghyun Kim, Junggab Son, Daehee Seo, Yeojin Kim, Hyobin Kim, and Jung Taek Seo
Abstract: This paper introduces a new fog-assisted cloud storage which can achieve much higher throughput
compared to the traditional cloud-only storage architecture by reducing the traffics toward the cloud storage. The
fog-storage service providers are transparency to end-users and therefore, no modification on the end-user devices
is necessary. This new system is featured with (1) a stronger audit scheme which is naturally coupled with the
proposed architecture and does not suffer from the replay attack and (2) a transparent and efficient compensation
mechanism for the fog-storage service providers. We provide rigorous theoretical analysis on the correctness and
soundness of the proposed system. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to discuss about a storage
data audit scheme for fog-assisted cloud storage as well as the compensation mechanism for the service providers
of the fog-storage service providers.
Key words: fog computing; cloud computing; network storage; data audit; merkle hash tree; integer factorization;
payment; transparency
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Introduction

It is widely believed that the concept of Internet-ofThings (IoT) will play an important role in shaping
our daily lives in the near future. IoT devices such
as smartwatchs and smartphones are highly resourcelimited due to the constraints on the size, weight,
and/or cost, and thus heavily rely on cloud service
providers. However, as the number of IoT device are
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rapidly growing, it is expected that in the following
years, the demand from numerous end-user IoT devices
toward the cloud service providers will exponentially
grow, exacerbate the already high communication
delay between end-user devices and the cloud service
providers, and eventually drop Quality-of-Experience
(QoE) of the IoT applications to an unacceptable level.
The notion of fog computing has been coined by
Cisco in 2012 to challenge the limit of the stateof-the-art cloud computing paradigm. The core idea
of fog computing is to migrate the functionalities of
central cloud to network edge closer to end-users so
that users’ QoE can be improved and the demands
toward cloud can be reduced. In many recent reports,
fog computing environment is envisioned as a spatiotemporal network of end-user IoT devices, regional fog
service providers, and back-end global cloud service
provider. However, despite many notable efforts such
as OpenFog Reference Architecture for fog computing
by Open Fog Consortium, there is no firm consensus
on how fog computing environment should be shaped
as of today. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that Software
Defined Network (SDN) technologies are frequently
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incorporated into fog computing environment to
realize various fog computing applications with
transparency[3] .
1.1

Data audit for fog-cloud storage service

Before the emergence of fog computing paradigm,
various cloud services are utilized to overcome the
limit of the resource constraint IoT devices. Cloud
storage is one of the main services provided by the
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to allow end-users to
overcome the storage capacity limit of their devices
and/or share important data among geographically
distributed clients. Data storage audit is an essential
service for the users of network attached storage such as
cloud storage and it aims to ensure the users that their
data on the cloud is sound, i.e., data is well-stored in
the storage and its content is exactly what the owner of
the data expects. In addition, in case of any data loss or
unauthorized alteration, the service will help to identify
the responsible entity. As a result, data storage audit is a
critical service accompanied by a commercial network
storage service requiring higher level of reliability.
Recently, the potential of fog computing paradigm to
implement various network storage services has been
investigated in the literatures[4–6] . In this fog-nodefront cloud-end storage model, or fog-cloud storage
in short, the data storage demands from users are
absorbed by local fog storage nodes if possible and
the rest is accommodated by the central cloud. As fogcloud storage is a network storage, it is desirable to
provide a data storage audit service for it. However,
it is not straightforward to adopt existing data storage
audit schemes designed for central cloud storage to fogcloud storage due to the following salient difference
among them: In the traditional central cloud storage
setting, a user explicitly deals with each CSP. Under the
circumstance, as soon as the CSP receives data from
a user and issues a undeniable receipt of the data to
the user, the CSP will be responsible for keeping the
data in its original form. On the other hand, in case of
fog-cloud storage environment, the data from the user is
stored among multiple fog nodes as well as the central
cloud, whose operators can be independent from each
other.
Furthermore, we believe that in order to minimize
the modification on end-user devices, it is ideal to
make the distribution of user data stored among the
various network storages (provided by fog operators
and cloud operator) and the generation of the receipt
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to be transparent to the user. This means that a data
storage audit scheme for fog-cloud storage should be
able to keep the track of the liability of each fog/cloud
service provider without a user intervention. Clearly,
this is a unique issue of fog-cloud storage environment
and the existing data storage audit scheme for cloud
storage cannot effectively handle.
To the best of our knowledge, however, no effort
has been made so far to introduce a data storage audit
scheme for fog-cloud storage service in the literature.
1.2

Compensation for fog-cloud storage service

Meanwhile, a fog-cloud storage framework with
transparency and auditability cannot be used in practice
if there is no practical compensation mechanism for
the fog and cloud storage service providers. That is,
unlike similar paradigms such as edge computing, in
which the edge devices in the closed region (e.g.,
subnet) form a kind of a union and help each other
without any explicit compensation, fog-cloud storage
paradigm requires explicit compensation to each fog
service operator for the services provided. As a result,
there is a need of a new compensation framework for
the fog-cloud storage architecture.
However, it is highly challenging to design a proper
compensation mechanism for this architecture while
maintaining the transparency of fog-storage service
providers. That is, it is necessary to make each fog
storage operator to be invisible from users, otherwise
it will impose significant overheads to the users,
e.g., keep the track of possibly temporal fog service
providers. This also means that each user does not
know which fog storage maintains which data of
his/hers. One straightforward solution to address this
issue is that the user provides the compensation to
the cloud operator, which is the only visible entity to
the user in this fog-cloud storage system. Then, the
cloud operator distributes the compensation to each
fog service provider proportional to their contributions
to maintain the user’s data. However, such approach
may suffer from a critical issue that when the payment
from the cloud to each fog operator is not delivered
on time for some reason, the fog storage service may
be suspended and the user, who paid all the required
fee for the compensation, may suffer from undesired
consequences, e.g., the data is not accessible to the user.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no work
discussing about a payment mechanism for fog cloud
storage system in the literature so far.
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1.3

Summary of contributions

In order to address the issues discussed so far,
this paper first introduces a new fog-cloud storage
framework with transparency and auditability. On the
top of the framework, we construct a transparent and
efficient compensation mechanism for the fog-cloud
storage service providers. The summary of our main
contributions is as below.
(1) New fog-cloud storage architecture with
efficiency and transparency: Our construction of the
framework consists of three main components: end-user
IoT devices, SDN-compatible fog routers with regional
fog storages, and global/central cloud storages (See
Fig. 1).
In our framework, an end-user IoT device submits an
upload request with a set of data blocks, to the fog-cloud
storage. Each upload request including data blocks is
being routed from the end-user IoT device toward the
central cloud storage throughout network routers, some
of which are SDN-compatible fog routers. Each of these
SDN-compatible fog router serves as a clusterhead
of the regional fog storages. For each request that
it receives, depending on available storage space, an

Fig. 1 Fog-storage environment is composed of five
SDN-compatible fog routers with regional fog storages
F=ffa , fb , fc , fd , fe g and a central cloud. Only four of them
provide storage service to the user u1 , so the routing path
from u1 to cloud becomes P 1 =u1 ! fa1 ! fb1 ! fd1 ! fe1 !
cloud if fc passes forward the data blocks to the next available
fog router fd without storing any subset of M, where M
represents a data message. Suppose that the user’s data
storage request is managed by only SDN-compatible fog
routers, and the central cloud does not store any subset of M.
Then the central cloud will only keep the receipt and prove
that the data integrity.

SDN-compatible fog router may accommodate some or
all of the data blocks in the upload request and forward
the request with the remaining (unaccommodated so
far by and fog storages) data block to the next hop
SDN-compatible fog router. The request will eventually
arrive at the cloud storage and any remaining data
blocks will be stored at the cloud storage.
There are several benefits of this framework. Most of
all, given that the capacity of regional fog storages is
sufficient, our framework is capable of reducing (a) the
amount of data blocks toward the central cloud storage
greatly, (b) the heavy traffics on the bottleneck routers
nearby the cloud storage, and consequently (c) from
the end-IoT device point of view, the time between
submitting the request and obtaining the confirmation
from the central cloud.
Second, in our framework, users do not need to
know the existence of fog infrastructure, but only
need to know the central cloud storage, and therefore
the proposed storage framework provides a flawless
transparency to the user.
(2) Efficient collection of receipt of data from fogcloud for user assurance: In the proposed framework,
while the upload request with data blocks of a user is
being forwarded from an end-user IoT device to the
back-end cloud storage, the head of each fog storage
cluster (an SDN-compatible fog router) on the routing
path between them can either decide to store some of the
data blocks inside fog storages within its own cluster.
If so, the cluster head issues a receipt for each of the
data blocks, and adds this receipts to the upload request,
and forwards the upload request which now includes
the rest of data blocks and receipts toward the next hop.
Otherwise, the whole upload request will be forwarded
to the next hop without any modification.
When the upload request arrives at the central
cloud, the request may or may not contain any data
blocks. It is important to notice that there exists a
receipt from a fog clusterhead for each missing data
block in the upload request. At this point, any data
block left in the upload request will be stored at the
central cloud. Then, the central cloud will issue an
accumulated receipt based on all the receipts in the
upload request as well as any receipt that it generates
and send the accumulated receipt to the user. After
the cryptographically constructed accumulated receipt
is obtained, the user can easily verify its validity, and
may delete its local copy if desired without worrying
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any data loss.
(3) Efficient verification of data with
accountability for lost data: After the initial
verification of accumulated receipt, a user may choose
to delete its local copy of the data blocks. Then, the
user may check the soundness of the data on the fogcloud later. Generally speaking, without the original
data, it is difficult for the user to check the soundness
of the data in the fog-cloud storage against the replay
attack of a fog storage or cloud storage. This is because
each storage may keep the receipt which was generated
during the initial setup and be able to reuse it. On the
other hand, the user is disadvantaged that as it does
not have the original data, it is difficult to check the
freshness of the receipt from the storages.
To resolve this issue, we introduce a new scheme to
regenerate a fresh challenge based on the initial receipt
of the data blocks without the actual copy by exploiting
integer factorization. As a result, each storage will
be able to generate a valid response with respect to
the fresh challenge only if the data blocks with it
are sound. At the end of the verification process, the
user will receive a single response from the cloud and
the transparency will be still maintained. In case that
the response is corrupted and the data block is not
sound, our framework will reveal which storages are
responsible for the loss along with undeniable proofs.
As a result, our scheme is proper to the fog-cloud
storage environment which may be operated by multiple
independent authority.
(4) A lightweight and transparent compensation
mechanism for the proposed fog-cloud storage
framework: We also introduce an efficient
compensation mechanism for our fog-cloud storage
service providers in our framework while maintaining
transparency. The main merits of the proposed
compensation mechanism are (a) Low computation
overhead. The proposed compensation scheme is
tightly coupled with our fog-cloud storage framework
and the operations at each end-user device are highly
light-weighted, e.g., cryptographic hash function
and symmetric encryption; (b) Low communication
overhead. In the proposed scheme, each user only
needs to upload one message to send the payment to
the central cloud operator and receive another message
(the receipt of the payment) from the central cloud
operator; and (c) Transparency. Our payment scheme
does not require the user to have any knowledge over
the underlying fog storage infrastructure, and each user
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only needs to know the central cloud operator.
1.4

Organization of this paper

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses related work. We introduce the details of our
fog-cloud storage architecture and the audit scheme
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses about our new
compensation mechanism for fog-cloud storage service
providers. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.

2

Related Work

Over years, the concept of cloud computing has
attracted much attentions and many efforts are made to
make it more useful and practical[7–11] . Fog computing
is an emerging network technology to overcome the
limit of popular cloud computing technology and
attracts much interest from both academia and industry
very recently. As the fog computing technology is
immature, only a handful of them discuss about the
architecture of fog system[12–15] and relevant security
issues[7, 16, 17] . As the research on the fog computing
is still in its early stage, most of papers in fog
computing architecture are struggling to define the
detailed structure and relevant performance metrics
based on Cisco’s original proposal for fog computing
structure[18] , which has a three-tiered structure of a
peer-to-peer network of IoT devices, an intermediate
fog layer between IoT devices and cloud servers,
and an established cloud structure. In addition to the
discussion on the details of fog computing architecture,
the authors in Refs. [13, 15] offered a new workload
allocation mechanism which offers tradeoff among
power consumption, service latency, CO2 emission,
etc. On the other hand, the authors in Refs. [7, 16,
17] have conduced a survey on the security concerns
and challenges in fog computing. Alrawais et al.[16]
introduced their case study on certification revocation
issue in IoT using fog computing environment.
However, none of these work has discussed about the
significance of data audit issue in fog-cloud storage
environment. To the best of our knowledge, data audit
issue has never been discussed in the context of fogcloud storage while some relevant results have been
reported in the context of cloud storage.
So far, various cloud storage auditing approaches
have been discussed in Refs. [19–26]. However, these
existing audit schemes have several problems, e.g.,
Third-Party Auditor (TPA) may leak the data or the
number of audit is limited. In Ref. [20], Yang and
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Jia provided a security analysis on those existing
audit schemes in terms of storage overhead and
communication cost. Their report shows that these
schemes are suffering from a common significant issue
that the amount of metadata to sustain the schemes will
grow unmanageably as the systems operate over time.
At the same time, all of these schemes require frequent
communications among users and TPA, therefore suffer
from large communication overhead. The more recent
works on cloud storage auditing[19, 22, 24, 26] have utilized
the famous Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) to introduce
a superior audit scheme for the cloud storage which
incurs much less metadata related storage overhead and
communication overhead than existing ones.
Recently, Liu et al.[19, 24] proposed a multi-replica
MHT for each data block in which the cloud storage
operator is notified if any of replica fails. In this
way, the communication overhead for verification is
alleviated and user’s data is more fault-resilient from
storage service flaw. Especially, the Multi-Replica
Dynamic Public Auditing (MuR-DPA) scheme in Ref.
[19] complements the problem that user should store
and generate each different MHT for every replica
so that it brings severe communication overheads.
However, it is not straightforward to apply these audit
schemes for cloud storage to fog-cloud storage directly
due to the unique nature of fog-cloud storage such as
multiple operating parties. Most importantly, all of the
existing MHT-based audit schemes suffer from a replay
attack; once a storage operator computed a hash value,
it can be reused to prove the soundness of the data even
though the data is altered or lost.

3
3.1

A New Fog-Cloud Storage Framework
with Transparency and Auditability
Proposed fog-cloud storage system model

The representative network architecture for the fogcloud data storage is illustrated in Fig. 1. There are three
main network entities:
(1) End-user IoT devices U D fu1 ; u2 ; : : : ; ujU j g,
(2) SDN-compatible fog routers F D ffa ; fb ; : : : ;
fjF j g, and
(3) The global cloud storage cloud.
Furthermore, each SDN-compatible fog router fi 2
F serves as a clusterhead of a set of regional fog
storages F S.fi /. In this fog-cloud storage framework,
we assume the gateway router of each user submitting

a data message M is the first SDN-compatible fog
router, fa , which is typically a gateway router of
the subnet with the user. Suppose that P` D u` !
fa` ! fb` !    ! fjF` j ! cloud is the routing path
from a user u` to the central cloud when all SDNincompatible fog routers are ignored. In order to
simplify our discussion, we assume that M consists
of k message blocks with uniform length, i.e.,
M D fm1 ; m2 ; : : : ; mk g, for some positive integer k.
After M is submitted and moves over the path P` , M
will be absorbed by some fog storage clusters and/or
the central cloud storage. Suppose that M.x/ is a
subset of message blocks in M stored by a storage
S
S
x 2 F fcloudg. Then, 8x; y 2 F fcloudg such that
T
x ¤ y, we have M.x/ M.y/ D ∅. For each mi 2
S
M , 9x 2 F fcloudg such that mi 2 M.x/.
This paper assumes that each fog storage cluster has
a limited storage capacity and the central cloud storage
has a unlimited capacity. This means that while M
moves over P` , M will be completely absorbed by fog
storage clusters, and the central cloud may not store
any subset of M . Even in such case, an empty storage
request (otherwise non-empty) will be forwarded the
next-hop toward the central cloud. Once cloud receives
the request, it will go to user.
3.2
3.2.1

Proposed fog-cloud storage audit scheme
Preliminaries

In fog-cloud storage processing, we introduce two
auditing modes:
(1) Initial audit mode, when a user stores data at the
first time, he/she can verify data integrity and decides to
delete original data file based on the verification, and
(2) Post-initial audit mode, when user retrieves user’s
data after deleting the original data, he/she can verify
data integrity.
An MHT is similar to the complete binary tree.
However, it is constructed by hashing paired data based
on a one-way cryptographic hash function. The leaf
nodes have hash value of the data blocks from user,
and non-leaf nodes have the hash value of its child
nodes. The root value of the MHT can be computed
through hash values and signatures from Fog-cloud
Storage Service Provider (FSSP). In order to support
the verification of data uploads, this authenticated data
structure is utilized in the initial audit mode, and Fig. 2
shows the example of the MHT based on the 15 data
blocks.
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33

jj
Fig. 2 An example of MHT. hi D h(mi ), hi, i+1 D h(hijj
jjhi+1 ), and h(hi, i+1jj
jjhi+2, i+3 )=h(h(hijj hi+1 )jj
jjh.hi+2jj
jjhi+3 )), where h is a hash
function that satisfies h: f0, 1g* ! f0, 1gn .

3.2.2

Design goal

Our fog-cloud storage auditing design goals can be
summarized as follows.
Fog-cloud storage auditability. User audits if the
data stored correctly through two modes, initial audit
mode and post-initial audit mode. At the first time
user uploads the data file to the fog-cloud storage, an
MHT is constructed according to the number of data
blocks. Each SDN-compatible fog router, which is on
the routing path P` , absorbs data blocks from a user.
Every time that the FSSP stores user’s data block, the
hash function operates for each node in MHT. Then user
can verify whether the FSSPs store user’s data correctly
or not by comparing the root value R of the MHT
between computed value of R and proved value of R by
cloud. Based on the initial audit verification, user can
delete original data file. Without the original data block,
user can verify the data integrity through the post-initial
audit mode. Based on the integer factorization, user
challenges the central cloud with modular equations.
Central cloud computes the linear congruences with the
user’s challenge k coprimes and responses the results to
the user. Then, user creates another linear congruences
for the verification equations with the challenge k
coprimes and the cloud’s responses. Finally, user
compares those equations. If they are correct, then the
verification of data integrity is proved.
Fog-cloud storage accountability. In this fog-cloud
storage architecture, the auditing scheme does not
only verify the data integrity but also allows to trace
all the participating SDN-compatible fog routers. If
the auditing scheme is aware of any fault in storage
processing, it records the rogue fog cluster based on
the receipt tuple which is generated by each SDN-

compatible fog router. Those discovered rogue fog
clusters are prohibited to participate in storage service
again later on.
3.2.3

Our construction

Unlike the cloud storage environment, fog-cloud
storage environment composed of much more storage
service providers. Thus, in the fog-cloud architecture,
it requires that each fog cluster to be verified for
data integrity respectively. To maintain not only
the efficiency of using fog-cloud storage over using
conventional central cloud storage service but also
preserving privacy and secure storage service, we
show how the existing cloud audit scheme should be
improved to apply properly to the fog-cloud storage
environment. The procedure of our audit scheme is as
follows.
Initial audit mode. Figure 3 shows the procedure of
initial audit mode for P1 D u1 ! fa1 ! fb1 ! fc1 !
fd1 ! cloud. In our MHT structure, each time the FSSP
provides storage service, a Receiptfi is generated. For
example, in Fig. 3, the receipt will be updated total
four times by the SDN-compatible fog routers fa , fb ,
fc , and fd . The Receiptfi is composed of 3-tuple of
.i ; S hi ; Mrem / where i represents data blocks which
are stored by fi in the current fog storage cluster, Shi
is a Signing hash value of i , and Mrem is a set of the
leftover data blocks.
The signing hash, S hi in the receipt tuple,
will be generated by following Algorithm 1.
GenSh.T:current; ski / generates Shi which is
corresponding to the hash values of the stored
data blocks by fi . With two input values, T:current as
a tree on the current node current and ski as a secret
key of fi , the function will return boolean value to
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Fig. 3 Reconstruct R. (a) Re-constructed MHT by fa , (b) re-constructed MHT by fb , (c) re-constructed MHT by fc , and (d)
re-constructed MHT by fd .

generate Signing hash for the subtree which is taken by
each SDN-compatible fog router. Since the hash value
can be computed only when the child nodes belong
to the same parent node, if fog router absorbs n leaf
nodes and partial nodes belong to the other parent node,
Algorithm 1 will generate a S igski for the child nodes
which have same parent, and will return F alse for the
Signing hash from the subtree.
Based on the original MHT in Fig. 2, suppose that
fa , fb , fc , and fd store 2, 4, 6, and 3 data blocks
in M , respectively. Figure 3a shows how the first
SDN-compatible fog router fa stores two data blocks
m1 and m2 , and generates a Receiptfa . The GenSh
generates Sigska which is corresponding to the hash
values h1 and h2 . Since two leaf nodes m1 and m2
have same parent node, the GenSh returns True from
the first if statement, and Sha is generated by fa . The
first receipt tuple is generated as .a ; Sha ; Mrem / where
a D fm1 ; m2 g, Sha D .Sigska ; h1;2 /, and Mrem D
fm3 ; m4 ; : : : ; m15 g. The MHT is reconstructed by fa
as illustrated in the bottom MHT of Fig. 3a. Next,

second SDN-compatible fog router fb stores four data
blocks m3 , m4 , m5 , and m6 . However, m3 ; m4 ; and
m5 ; m6 belong to two different parent nodes. Thus,
this time the GenSh returns False from the first if
statement, and next retValL will be True and retValR
will be False. First two hash values h3 and h4 , from
m3 and m4 , will generate h.h3 jjh4 /, then with this
hash value its parent node will have new hash h3;4 with
Sigskb . Last two hash values h5 and h6 , from m5 and
m6 , will generate S hb . The new updated receipt tuple
Receiptfb D .b ; .Sha;b ; S hb /; Mrem /, where
b D fm3 ; m4 ; m5 ; m6 g;
Sha;b D ...Sigska ; h1;2 /; .Sigskb ; h3;4 //; h.h1;2 jjh3;4 //;
Shb D .Sigskb ; h5;6 /;
Mrem D fm7 ; m8 ; : : : ; m15 g:
The MHT is reconstructed by fb as illustrated in the
bottom MHT of Fig. 3b. Third SDN-compatible fog
router fc stores six data blocks m7 ; m8 ; : : : ; m12 , and
generates a Receiptfc . The GenSh generates Sha;b;c and
Shc for the MHT by fc . The new updated receipt tuple
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Algorithm 1: Generation of Shi in receipt tuple
GenSh.T:current; ski /;
Input : 
a: hash tree T of the current node current, and a
private key ski of the fog router fi
Output: True or False
begin
if (current DD leaf) && (current DD owned) then
return True;
else if (current DD ownedByOthers) then
return False;
retValL= GenSh.T:current.left/; ski /;
retValR= GenSh.T:current.right/; ski /;
if (retValL DD True) && (retValR DD True) then
return True;
else if (retValL DD True) && (retValR DD False) then
generate a Sigskj for left subtree with current.left/
as the root;
return False;
else if (retValL DD False) && (retValR DD True) then
generate a Sigskj for right subtree with
current.right/ as the root;
return False;
else
return False;
end


is .c ; Sha;b;c ; Shc ; Mrem / where
c D fm7 ; m8 ; : : : ; m12 g;
Sha;b;c D ...Sha;b /; .Sigskb ; h5;6 /; .Sigskc ; h7;8 //;
h.h1;2;3;4 jjh5;6;7;8 //;
Shc D .Sigskc ; h.h9;10 jjh11;12 //;
Mrem D fm13 ; m14 ; m15 g:
The MHT is reconstructed by fc as illustrated
in the bottom MHT of Fig. 3c. The last SDNcompatible fog router fd stores the remaining three
data blocks m13 , m14 , and m15 . The new updated
receipt tuple, Receiptfd , is .d ; .Sha;b;c ; Shc;d /; Mrem /
where d D fm13 ; m14 ; m15 g, Sha;b;c is same as
the previous receipt tuple, Shc;d D ...Shc /; .Sigskd ;
h.h13;14;15 ///; h.h9;10;11;12 jjh13;14;15 //, and Mrem D
∅. The MHT is reconstructed by fd as illustrated in
the bottom MHT of Fig. 3d.
The cloud will have final receipt from previous fog
routers. User can verify if his/her data stored correctly
without any changes by comparing the computed root of
MHT and proof of R which is provided by the cloud. If
the value is not same, the data is not soundness, then the
central cloud detects the accountability of participated
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fog storage cluster by audit all the Signing hash in the
receipt tuple.
Post-initial audit mode. The initial audit mode could
efficiently and effectively provide recepits for users’
data. However, after the initail step, the FSSP could
bypass the audit process by simply storing all the
hash values of users’ data. To address this problem,
we propose the post-initial audit mode. Although
this auditing process will be described in a user’s
point of view, it can be periodically performed by a
TPA[22] to lessen burden of users and to prevent users’
misbehaviors.
After user verifies the data integrity through the initial
audit mode, user decides whether deleting the local
data file or not. Without the original data file, user
still must verify the data integrity and central cloud
should not be able to deceive user by replay attack.
For this issue, the post-initial audit mode provides that
the user can verify by computing reasonable number
of linear congruence equations selectively. Before
user deletes the original data, k linear congruence
equations are generated as follows: m1 modp1 D x1 ;
m2 modp2 D x2 ; : : : ; mk modpk D xk . We assume that
the pi s are RSA moduli with safe primes[27] .
In these equations, m1 ; m2 ; : : : ; mk represent the
original data blocks user has stored, and p1 ; p2 ; : : : ; pk
represent the pairwise coprimes which are used to
compute a remainder for each data block. To improve
the storage efficiency of users, pi can be replaced to an
index of the prime table. Now, the user is able to delete
original data file after keep the values of x1 ; x2 ; : : : ; xk ,
the corresponding indices of the prime table.
Now without the original data, user can audit
for his/her data soundness through four steps: (1)
Challenge, (2) Compute, (3) Response, and (4) Verify
(See Fig. 4). In order to challenge the central cloud,
user chooses three or four data blocks’ indices as the
challenge parameters, and then generates ˛ D .pi 
pj   pn /c, where c is a randomly generated prime

Fig. 4 Challenge and response communication in postinitial audit mode.
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number used to hide the block primes, and i; j; : : : ; n
indicate the indices of data blocks. Then the user
challenges the central cloud with C hal.˛; i; j; : : : ; n/.
Since the value of ˛ becomes larger exponentially
as user chooses more challenge primes, three or four
number of challenge parameters are preferred to be
selected for a single challenge. This minor weakness
can easily be overcomed by repeating the auditing
process or sending multiple challenges.
Suppose that the user challenges with four message
blocks, m1 ; m3 ; m4 , and m5 . Upon receiving the
challenge Chal.˛; 1; 3; 4; 5/ from a verifier, the prover
who should retain the original data including m1 ; m3 ;
m4 ; and m5 will compute as following equations:
m1 mod ˛ D C1 ; m3 mod ˛ D C2 ; m4 mod ˛ D C3 ; and
m5 mod ˛DC4 . Next, the prover sends the computation
results Response.C1 ; C2 ; C3 ; C4 / to the verifier.
Now, user can verify the data integrity through
comparing following verification equations: C1 modp1
‹

‹

‹

D x1 ; C2 modp3 D x3 ; C3 modp4 D x4 ; and C4 modp5
‹

D x5 . If these verification equations have same solution
to x1 ; x3 ; x4 ; and x5 , then it is proved that user’s data
is possessed correctly in the fog-cloud storage. If any of
those verification equations have incorrect solution, the
verification is failed. In this case, user should be able to
demand the accountability of participated fog storage
cluster.
Fog-cloud storage accountability. Based on the
result from two audit modes, the fog-cloud storage
scheme provides an accountability to manage the
rogue FSSP. Accountability in the fog-cloud storage
environment is necessary due to lots of fog participants
provide the storage service. In both initial and postinitial audit modes, if the soundness of data is broken,
the central cloud is not possible to create the right
response for the verification proof.
For the initial audit mode, since the user obtains a
final receipt from the central cloud, R can be computed
with Shi D .Sigsk ; hi / and user verifies the Sigsk for
each data block. Then, user compares R with cloud’s
response. User will trust the data stored correctly if
the verifications passed. Otherwise, the user makes a
request for finding data blocks that have errors, and
the FSSP investigates the user’s data depending on
the Receipts received from nodes. The user sends the
data block and performs the initial audit mode again.
Once the verification is proved through the initial audit
service, deleting the user’s original data is safe.

For the post-initial audit mode, during the user
challenges the central cloud, in order to make modular
equations, more than one p 2 P are used as moduli
corresponding to the indices of data block which is
selected by user. User will trust that the retrieved
data is genuine if all the selective modular equations
have correct answers, otherwise user detects the index
number of the data blocks from the modular equation
which had incorrect answer. For example, suppose that
the user challenges central cloud with three challenge
parameters, Chal.˛; 2; 5; 6/, and one of the verification
equations is not correct such as C1 modp2 D x2 ,
C2 modp5 D x5 , and C3 modp6 ¤ x6 , then the user
can detect which data block makes to fail the audit
verification. In this situation, user reports the data block,
m6 , to the central cloud. Through this report, the central
cloud can track which fog cluster stores m6 , and the
SDN-compatible fog router in the detected fog cluster
will hold the ultimately accountable to the data integrity
violation.
3.3

Security analysis of the proposed audit
schemes

This section provides security analyses of the proposed
fog-cloud storage audit scheme. Specifically, we prove
that the FSSP cannot generate a correct proof which
will pass the auditing process without possession of
original data. The security of our auditing scheme
is based on one-wayness of a cryptographic hash
function, unforgeability of a digital signature scheme,
and difficulty of integer factorization.
Theorem 1 Suppose the proposed scheme is
developed with the one-way hash function and the
unforgeable digital signature scheme. Then, it is
computationally impossible for the FSSP to generate
a valid proof without absorbing whole original data in
polynomial time, which can pass the initial audit mode.
Proof As the root of MHT is computed based on
all of the data blocks, there are two ways for the
FSSP to pass the initial audit mode: (1) it computes
a receipt with the actual data blocks or (2) it uses
unjust way to compute the root of MHT without data
blocks, where (2) can be covered by the following cases:
(a) Dishonesty of fog nodes. A node may pretend to
absorb more data blocks than it actually did, which
brings more profit to the node. However, this case can
be easily detected by FSSP as all SDN-compatible fog
routers must generate a signature for their absorption.
If the node cannot generate a forged signature, it also
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cannot repudiate the generated signature. In addition,
the dishonesty will not pass the post-initial audit mode
without actual data blocks. (b) Dishonesty of FSSP.
The FSSP may try to generate a correct root without
original data blocks upon data loss or other unintended
errors. All that the FSSP can do for this case is guessing
the root depending on partial information. Although
the success probability is extremely low, the FSSP
might pick a correct value for the root. Unfortunately,
it is computationally infeasible to pass the post-initial
audit mode, and thus, the FSSP will fail to pass latter
auditing. We will provide security analysis for the postinitial audit mode in Theorem 2.

Definition 1 (Integer factorization problem[28] )
Suppose there exists a polynomial-time algorithm,
named GenModulus, which takes 1k as an input and
outputs .N; p; q/ such that N D pq, p and q are k-bit
prime, and k is a security parameter. Then, we can say
integer factorization is hard relative to the GenModulus
if for all probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the
following probability is negligible:
PrŒGenModulus.1k / ! .N; p; q/I
A.N / ! .p; q/ W N D pq:
Theorem 2 If there exists an oracle that can break
the post-initial audit mode, then it can also break RSA
public key cryptosystem.
Proof If a user generates a challenge with only
two primes (one is a data block prime and the other is
randomly chosen prime), the security of the proposed
scheme depends on Definition 1. However, since the
proposed scheme assumed to use up to four primes
for a single challenge, we prove that it is still secure.
Let O be an oracle that can break the post-initial audit
mode. It takes a large composite number N as an input
and outputs four primes p1 ; p2 ; p3 ; and p4 . We will
show that O can also break RSA system. Suppose a
user A’s private/public key pair was generated based
on sufficiently large number NA ; NA D q1  q2 , and
another user B’s private/public key pair was generated
based on sufficiently large number NB ; NB D q3  q4 .
Then, a malicious adversary captures the two numbers
and sends a query to O including NA  NB for the input.
The O will return four prime numbers, and finally, the
adversary will be able to compute private keys of both
the user A and the user B. Therefore, we can say that
the proposed scheme is as secure as RSA cryptosystem
by reduction.
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A
Lightweight
and
Transparent
Compensation Mechanism for Fog-Cloud
Storage

In this chapter, we introduce a new compensation
mechanism for the proposed fog-cloud storage
framework that we have proposed in the previous
chapter.
4.1

Proposed compensation mechanism

Once data is uploaded to the fog-cloud storage in our
fog-cloud storage framework, a proper compensation
has to be paid within every interval for the continuity
of the service. The proposed compensation scheme
consists of the following three distinct phases:
(1) compensation preparation, (2) compensation
distribution, and (3) compensation acknowledgement.
In the followings, we will explain each phase in detail.
4.1.1

Compensation preparation

Once the data is uploaded, the user prepares the
following for the payment. In detail, for each message
block mi , the user computes a key keyi D H.mi /,
where H is a cryptographic hash function. Consider
K D fkey1 ; key2 ; : : : ; keyn g is the key sequence
computed in this way. Then, the user prepares n
encrypted payment coupons P D fp1 ; p2 ; : : : ; pn g for
the message blocks, where pi is a combination of (1)
an integer i (corresponding message block id), and (2)
a compensation ticket CTi and a random number qi
encrypted by a symmetric encryption scheme such as
AES with the key keyi . The philosophy of this design
is that once pi is given to a router which has witnessed
mi , it will be able to extract CTi and qi with the key
keyi D H.mi /. Then, the router will be able to use CTi
to deposit the payment, while it can use qi to report
back to the user that the payment is correctly received.
4.1.2

Compensation distribution

After the compensation preparation phase, the user
sends P to the central cloud. Starting from the cloud,
the payment coupon is distributed in the reverse order
of the routers appeared in R, which is the order of
routers over which the message M is delivered toward
the central cloud. For each router ri (starting from
i D c), it will take the payment tuples corresponding
to the blocks stored in the regional storage C.ri /. For
instance, if ri has mj 1 and mj , pj 1 and pj will be
taken by ri (its operator). Then, the rest of payment
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tuples in P will be forwarded to the next router ri 1 .
Figure 5 illustrates the processes of uploading the data
blocks M and payment coupons P .
4.1.3

Compensation acknowledgement

For each router ri in the reverse order of the
appearance in R, it decrypts corresponding payment
tuples and obtains random variables inside the tuples.
For example, suppose rc decrypted .CTn 2 ; yn 2 /,
.CTn 1 ; yn 1 /, and .CTn ; yn /. Then, it first computes
the first block of the hash chain HCn D H.yn /. Then,
the second block of the hash chain HCn 1 D H.yn 1 ;
H Cn / is computed. Finally, it computes the third
block of the hash chain HCn 2 D H.yn 2 ; HCn 1 /.
Then, HCn 2 is passed to the next hop router in the
reverse sequence, rc 1 . After this process is recursively
executed, r1 will have HC1 , and then pass it to rc .
Finally, rc passes to the user. As the user has the
knowledge of P as well as all random variables in
the payment coupons y1 ; y2 ; : : : ; yn , it will be able to
compute HC1 by itself and compare it with what is
received from rc . If both match, this indicates that all
payment coupons are successfully received.
4.1.4

Merit of proposed system

In this subsection, we discuss three major merits of the
proposed scheme: (1) low computation overhead, (2)
low communication overhead, and (3) transparency to

end-user devices.
Low computation overhead at user side. For the
compensation distribution, the user needs to compute
a hash value for each of n messages and encrypt a
payment coupon for the message with the hased value.
For the verification of acknowledgement, it needs to
compute a hash chain of the n random values. As a
result, the whole process requires 2n hash function
computations and n symmetric encryptions. As both
computations are not heavy, the proposed system incurs
low computation overhead at the user terminal device.
Low communication overhead. In the proposed
scheme, in addition to upload the n message blocks,
the user needs to upload the set P of the n payment
coupons and download a single hash chain value to
verify the correct receipt of the payment coupons. As
a result, the whole process requires only n C 1 message
exchanges other than the upload of the n message
blocks. Therefore, the proposed system does cause low
communication overhead.
Transparency. The user uploads the message blocks
toward the central cloud, and during the course of
routing of the blocks toward the central cloud, each
regional fog cluster absorbs some part of the blocks
autonomously, and the user receives the confirmation
of the receipt of stored data from the cloud. On the
other hand, the payment coupons go directly to the

Fig. 5 Process of uploading the data block M and payment coupons P. In this example, u uploads a message M with 10 blocks
fm0 , m1 , : : : , m9 g. M first arrives at r1 which stores M(r1 ) =fm0 , m1 g. Then, the residual message blocks M M(r1 ) are forwarded
[ M(r2 )) to r3 . r3 stores M(r3 ) =fm5 , m6 g and forwards M (M(r1 )[
[
to r2 . r2 stores M(r2 ) = fm2 , m3 , m4 g and forwards M (M(r1 )[
M(r2 ) [ M(r3 )) to r4 . r4 stores M(r4 )= fm7 , m8 g and forwards M (M(r1 ) [ M(r2 ) [ M(r3 ) [ M(r4 )) to rc . rc stores all of the residual
message blocks which were not stored so far. Once the message blocks in M are stored across the networked storage clusters,
the set of payment coupons P is sent to rc . rc takes fp9 g which is corresponding to the data block it stores, which is P(rc ) = fm9 g.
Then, the rest of the payment coupons P fp9 g are sent to r4 . In the following, each of r4 , r3 , r2 , and r1 takes P(r4 ) = fp7 , p8 g,
P(r3 ) = fp5 , p6 g, P(r2 ) = fp2 , p3 , p4 g, and P(r1 ) = fp0 , p1 g, respectively, and each of the subset of payment coupons is corresponding
to the data blocks each networked storage cluster store.
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central cloud and distribute among the responsible local
fog storages. During the whole process, the user only
can see the cloud and interact only with the cloud.
Therefore, the proposed system does not require any
change on existing end-user terminal devices as long as
they are capable of interacting cloud infrastructure.
4.2

Analysis of proposed system

We divide the proposed system into two phases: (1)
compensation distribution phase, and (2) compensation
acknowledgement phase, and provide the correctness
analysis for each of them.
4.2.1

Correctness of the proposed compensation
scheme

In this subsection, we prove the correctness of our
compensation scheme. Let us introduce some notations
and definitions first. Then, we will prove the correctness
of the proposed scheme.
We first introduce some additional notations to make
our discussion easier. Given a router ri , M.ri / is the set
of message blocks stored at C.ri /, the storage cluster
whose head is ri . W .ri / is the subset of message blocks
of M which have been witnessed (stored or forwarded
to the next hop router) by ri . P .ri / is the subset of
payment coupons of P which have been witnessed
(taken or forwarded to the next hop router) by ri . N.ri /
is the subset of payment coupons of P which have
been taken by ri . For each mj 2 M , we say pj is the
corresponding payment coupon to mj , i.e., using mj ,
pj can be decrypted and C Ti can be revealed. Then,
we define mOj D pj and pOj D mj , respectively. Now,
we present some important definitions.
Definition 2 (Effect payment tuple) A tuple
.mi ; pj /, where mi is a message block and pj is a
payment coupon, is an effective payment tuple if i D j .
Definition 3 (Overpayment) A compensation
scheme C for the proposed storage system allows an
overpayment if an ri is able to access the compensation
ticket C Ti inside a payment coupon pi which is
corresponding to a message block mi which is not
stored in M.ri /.
Definition 4 (Underpayment) A compensation
scheme C for the proposed storage system allows
an underpayment if an ri is not able to access the
compensation ticket C Ti inside a payment coupon pi
which is corresponding to a message block mi which is
stored in M.ri /.
Definition 5 (Correct compensation scheme) A
compensation scheme C for the proposed storage
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system is correct if it does not allow both overpayment
and underpayment.
Now, we show that the proposed scheme is correct. In
particular, we show the proposed compensation scheme
will not allow any underpayment (Theorem 3) as well
as overpayment (Theorem 4).
Lemma 1 (Partitioning property) For every pair
of i; j such that 1 6 i; j 6 c, and i ¤ j , we have
T
M.ri / M.rj / D ∅. Furthermore, for each mi , there
exists a j 2 Œ1; : : : ; c such that mi 2 M.rj /.
Proof By the construction of the system, each
message block mj arrived at ri has two options. The
first option is stored inside M.ri /. The second option
is being forwarded to the next storage cluster, whose
head is a fog-aware SDN router, ri C1 . Therefore, if
a router ri decided to store a message mj into M.ri /,
this means that all routers rk such that k < i denied to
store mj . Furthermore, as ri will not forward to any mj
to the next hop router, no storage cluster M.rq / with
i < q will have a chance to store mj . Consequently,
each block in M will be stored at a unique storage
cluster. Furthermore, if mj will be always stored by
some storage cluster, M.rc / will always store a message
block denied by all other storage clusters. Therefore,
this theorem is true.

Lemma 2 ri can extract a payment ticket C Tj if
mj 2 W .ri / and pj 2 P .ri /.
Proof As the key to decrypt pj to take C Tj out is
k D H.mj /, this lemma is true. [

Lemma 3 W .ri / D M
pOl :
pl 2P .ri

1/

Proof By the construction of the message block
uploading process, we have W .rj /  W .ri / for any 1 6
i < j 6 c. Now, consider ri for some 1 6 i 6 c. Then,
W .ri / can be interpreted as a subset of message blocks
that are witnessed by any of ri . By the construction
of our payment coupon distribution scheme, as a part
of P is originally given to rc , then the remainders
are forwarded to rc 1 , and so on, when the residual
payment coupons are arrived at ri , all payment coupons
associated with W .ri / are used and the rest will be given
to ri 1 . Due to the reason, M can be partitioned into
two message block subsets W .ri / and M 0 , which is
the set of message blocks whose associated payment
coupons are given to ri 1 . In other word, we have
[
M D W .ri / C
pOl :
pl 2P .ri

1/

Therefore this lemma is true.

Theorem 3 The proposed compensation scheme

Tsinghua Science and Technology, February 2020, 25(1): 28–43

40

does not cause an underpayment.
Proof In order to prevent an underpayment, for
each ri , if mj 2 M.ri /, then pj 2 N.ri / should be
true. In other word, ri should have an effective payment
tuple .mj ; pj /, otherwise an underpayment will occur
by Lemma 2. First, by the construction of the message
block uploading process, we have
M.ri / D W .ri / W .ri C1 /
(1)
Next, by the construction of the payment coupon
distribution process, the subset of payment coupon
taken by ri , N.ri /, is equivalent to
P .ri / P .ri 1 /
(2)
Furthermore, from Lemma 3, we have
[
W .ri / D M
pOl
pl 2P .ri

(3)

1/

and
[

W .ri C1 / D M

pOl

(4)

pl 2P .ri /

By combining Eqs. (1), (3), and (4), we have
M.ri / DW .ri / W .ri C1 / D

 

[
[
M
pOl
M
pOl D
pl 2P .ri

[

1/

pl 2P .ri /

[

pOl

pl 2P .ri /

pl 2P .ri

[

pOl D
1/

pOl

pl 2P .ri / P .ri

(5)

1/

Therefore, mj 2 M.ri / means
[
mj 2
pl 2P .ri / P .ri

pOl ;
1/

and this implies
pj 2 P .ri /

P .ri

1 /;

where P .ri / P .ri 1 / is in fact N.ri /, the subset of
payment coupons taken by ri (see Eq. (2)). As a result,
this theorem is true.

Theorem 4 The proposed compensation scheme
does not allow an overpayment.
Proof By Lemma 1, each block mj is stored by
a unique ri , but witnessed by all rk such that 1 6
k < i. Therefore, some of such rk may exploit its
knowledge on mj to achieve an overpayment if they
also have a knowledge of pj . In the proposed payment
scheme, in order to prevent an overpayment, for any
mj 62 M.ri /, ri should not know pj , i.e., pj 62 P .ri /,
otherwise an overpayment will occur by Lemma 2.
By the construction of the message block uploading
process, for any mj , if mj 2 W .ri / and mj 62 M.ri /,

then mj 2 W .ri C1 /, i.e., ri forwards mj to the next
hop router. Meanwhile, mj 2 W .ri C1 / implies that
9q > i C1 such that mj 2 M.rq / by the construction of
the message block uploading process. By Theorem 3, rq
should know pj . At the same time, by the construction
of the payment coupon distribution process, for all l
such that 1 6 l < q, pj 62 P .rl /. As i < i C 1 6 q,
pj 62 P .ri / should be also true. As a result, pj 62 P .ri /
is true and this theorem is proved.

Theorem 5 The proposed compensation scheme is
correct and each router ri will be paid exactly for the
messages stored in M.ri /.
Proof By Definition 5, the proposed compensation
scheme is correct if no overpayment or underpayment is
possible. By Theorem 4, no overpayment is possible in
the proposed compensation scheme. By Theorem 3, no
underpayment is possible in the proposed compensation
scheme. Therefore, this theorem is correct and the
proposed compensation scheme is correct.

4.2.2

Correctness
of
acknowledgment scheme

compensation

The compensation acknowledgment scheme is based on
the construction of a hash chain using the random value
embedded in each payment coupon. The random value
can be extracted only if the compensation ticket inside
the payment coupon is correct extracted.
Suppose rc ! rc 1 !    ! r2 ! r1 is the
order of routers (fog storage cluster heads) receiving the
payment coupons. For each ri in this sequence starting
from i D c, it takes a set of payment coupon P .ri / and
decrypts the coupon. If the decryption was successful,
then ri can obtain both a compensation ticket CTj and
a random number yj for each mj 2 M.ri /.
By the construction of the hash chain, ri which
owns mj can compute HCj based on yj from pj and
the previous computed hash chain value HCj C1 from
ri C1 or ri itself. It is important to notice that by the
construction of the hash chain, regardless the ownership
of mj C1 , HCj is uniquely computed as long as every
rk for k > i decrypted the payment coupons associated
with the message blocks stored at them and extracted
the random value to compute valid hash chain. Due to
the same reason, r1 will be able to compute a unique
HC1 corresponding all pi s.
Once HC1 is given to the user through rc , the
user can compute HC1 on its own, which does not
require the knowledge of which ri and which mj and
pj . Due to the collision freeness of hash function,
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the output of a hash chain operation with n random
variables fy11 ; y21 ; : : : ; yn1 g will be different from m
2
random variables fy12 ; y22 ; : : : ; ym
g if n ¤ m, there
1
exists a pair of random values yi ¤ yi2 , or the order of
random variables applied to the hash chain computation
is different. Otherwise, the output of two hash chain
operations will be exactly same.
By comparing HC1 from rc with the HC1 computed
by the user in the same order (i.e., starting from yn ,
decrease the subscript by 1 up to y1 ), the user can verify
if all payment coupons are correctly received.

devices. Along with the new storage framework,
we introduce two essential mechanisms, stored data
integrity audit mechanism as well as storage service
provider compensation mechanism. We believe that our
seminary work will open a new research direction in
the area of fog-cloud storage. However, it will also
bring a number of security and privacy issues by nature
as it promotes further distribution of user data over
distributed storages each of which could be operated by
different entities. Therefore, we plan to further study
these issues and develop security measure of them.

5

Acknowledgment

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

In our discussion of the storage framework and audit
scheme, we focus on how to storage a given set of
data and how to produce receipt for audit. As a result,
one may wonder how to deal with constantly incoming
data stream as well as how to deal with dynamic stored
data update. In the following, we outline our idea
to deal with the situations. Now, consider that given
an application data M, we can always split M into
messages fM1 ; M2 ; : : : ; Ma g with maximum size limit,
e.g., 64 KB. Then, each Mi 2 M can be further divided
into a number of message blocks fmi;1 ; mi;2 ; : : : ; mi;b g
such that b 6 bmax , where bmax is the maximum number
of message blocks which can be included in a single
message. This means that for any root of a hash tree, a
message Mi consists of at most bmax leaf values.
From the beginning of a new data uploading flow, if
the total number of data blocks uploaded so far is less
than bmax , we can also add them to the current hash
tree. Once the number of blocks reaches at bmax , then
a new hash tree has to be constructed. In order to add
a new block to a hash tree, it is better to use a delayed
update. That is, if we want to add a new block each
time it arrives, we need to recompute at most h hash
values, where h is the height of the current hash tree.
This means that to add k new blocks, we may need
to perform h  k hash computations. The overhead of
repeatedly computing hash values (and signing on the
values) could be significantly reduced if we add k new
blocks all together. The approach described above, i.e.,
pending update, is also useful to improve the efficiency
of the proposed system when the update is needed.
In this paper, we propose a new fog-cloud storage
framework with transparency such that users only see
the existence of the cloud, and therefore there is no
need to modify the existing end-user IoT terminal
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